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We provide a simple method to obtain an upper bound on the secret key rate that is particu-
larly suited to analyze practical realizations of quantum key distribution protocols with imperfect
devices. We consider the so-called trusted device scenario where Eve cannot modify the actual de-
tection devices employed by Alice and Bob. The upper bound obtained is based on the available
measurements results, but it includes the effect of the noise and losses present in the detectors of
the legitimate users.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is a technique
that allows two parties, typically called Alice and Bob,
to generate an unconditionally secure secret key. This
secret key can then be used together with the Vernam
cipher [3] to achieve unconditionally secure communica-
tions against any possible eavesdropper, named Eve.
Typical practical QKD protocols distinguish two
phases in order to generate a secret key. In the first
phase, an effective bipartite quantum state is distributed
between Alice and Bob. This state creates correlations
between them and it might contain as well hidden corre-
lations with Eve. Next, Alice and Bob perform a set of
measurements on the given signal states in order to mea-
sure these correlations. As a result, they obtain a joint
probability distribution p(ai, bj) ≡ pij describing their
classical outcomes. In the second phase, Alice and Bob
try to distill a secret key from these correlated data pij by
means of public discussions over an authenticated clas-
sical channel. This procedure includes postselection of
data, error correction to reconcile the data, and privacy
amplification to decouple the data from Eve [4]. In this
second phase, no quantum-mechanical manipulations are
performed; it is a completely classical process.
Two types of schemes are used to create the correlated
data in the first phase of QKD. In entanglement-based
(EB) schemes, a source, which is assumed to be under
Eve’s control, produces a bipartite quantum state ρAB
that is distributed to Alice and Bob. Eve could even
have a third system entangled with those given to the
legitimate users. Alice and Bob measure each incoming
signal by means of two positive operator valued measures
(POVM) {Ai} and {Bj}, respectively. While the subsys-
tems measured by Alice and Bob result in correlations
described by a joint probability distribution pij , Eve can
use her subsystem to obtain information about the data
of the legitimate users.
In prepare and measure (PM) schemes, Alice prepares a
state |ϕi〉 with probability pi and sends it to Bob. On the
receiving side, Bob measures each received signal with a
POVM described by the quantum operators {Bj}. Gen-
eralizing the ideas introduced by Bennett et al. [5], the
signal preparation process in PM schemes can be thought
of as follows: Alice produces first the bipartite quantum
state |ψsource〉AB =
∑
i
√
pi|αi〉A|ϕi〉B and, afterward,
she measures the first subsystem in the orthogonal basis
|αi〉A. This action generates the (nonorthogonal) signal
states |ϕi〉 with probabilities pi. It is important to note
that in PM schemes, the reduced density matrix of Al-
ice, ρA = TrB(|ψsource〉AB〈ψsource|), is fixed and cannot
be modified by Eve. The state ρA depends only on the
probabilities pi and on the overlap of the signals states
|ϕi〉. This information is known to all the parties. To
include it in the measurement process one can add to the
observables {Ai ⊗Bj} measured by Alice and Bob other
observables {Ck⊗1 } such that the observables {Ck} form
a tomographically complete set of Alice’s Hilbert space
[6].
From now on, we will always use the term entangle-
ment and detection devices without making any further
distinction between these two different QKD schemes.
Moreover, pij and {Ai ⊗ Bj} refer to the complete set
of measurements, i.e., they include also the observables
{Ck ⊗ 1 } for PM schemes.
An essential question in QKD is whether the corre-
lated data contained in pij allow Alice and Bob to gen-
erate a secret key. In Ref. [7], it has been proven that a
necessary precondition for secure key distribution is the
provable presence of quantum correlations in pij . In this
context, see also Ref. [8]. Given the set of measurements
performed by Alice and Bob together with the resulting
probabilities pij , the legitimate users can calculate the
equivalence class S of quantum states that are compati-
ble with the observed data pij :
S = {ρAB | Tr(Ai ⊗Bj ρAB) = pij , ∀i, j} . (1)
By definition, every state ρAB ∈ S can represent the state
shared by Alice and Bob before their measurements [9].
According to Ref. [7], in order to be able to distill a se-
cret key from the observed data, it is necessary to prove
2that the equivalence class S does not contain any sepa-
rable state. See also Ref. [8]. This task is called effective
entanglement verification, where the word “effective” is
used to emphasize that the entanglement which might be
contained in the state ρAB is destroyed by Alice and Bob
after their measurements or might not have been present
at all in PM schemes. To deliver this entanglement proof,
one can employ any separability criteria [10]. One pos-
sibility particularly suited for this purpose is the use of
entanglement witnesses [6, 7].
From Ref. [7], we learn that, once the first phase of
QKD is complete, we need to find quantum-mechanical
correlations in pij . As it is, the effective entanglement
verification answers only partially the important ques-
tion of how much secret key can Alice and Bob obtain
from their correlated data: it just tells if the secret key
rate KS is zero or it may be positive. The problem of
finding upper bounds for KS was recently analyzed from
an entanglement theory point of view by K. Horodecki et
al. in Ref. [11]. These authors showed that the value of
KS that can be extracted from a quantum state ρAB can
be strictly greater than the distillable entanglement [13],
and it is generally bounded from above by the regular-
ized relative entropy of entanglement E∞r (ρAB) [11, 12].
This upper bound takes only into account the form of
ρAB and assumes perfect detection devices for Alice and
Bob. To calculate the regularized relative entropy of en-
tanglement of a given quantum state is, in general, a
quite difficult task, and analytical expressions are only
available for some particular states [14]. Another well-
known upper bound on KS is the so-called intrinsic in-
formation proposed by Maurer and Wolf [20]. See also
Refs. [7, 15, 16]. In this case, one can easily incorporate
the possible imperfections of the detectors in the upper
bound. However, it requires to solve an infimum ranging
over the set of all possible discrete probability distribu-
tions, or discrete channels, which is in principle not easy
to compute. (See also Ref. [17].)
In this paper, we present a simple method to obtain an
upper bound on KS that is particularly suited to evalu-
ate the secret key rate on practical realizations of QKD
schemes. Moreover, this procedure has the advantage
that is is straightforward to calculate. It is based on
the correlated data pij , and it also monitors any form
of detector imperfections. Specifically, we consider the
so-called trusted device scenario where Eve cannot mod-
ify the actual detection devices employed by Alice and
Bob. We assume that the legitimate users have complete
knowledge about their detectors, which are fixed by the
actual experiment. These detectors might be noisy and
might introduce losses and they are characterized by the
POVMs {Ai} and {Bj}.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we in-
troduce two desired properties for any upper bound on
KS for practical QKD: effective entanglement verifica-
tion, and the ability to monitor any kind of imperfec-
tions in Alice’s and Bob’s detection setups. This section
contains as well a brief summary of some known upper
bounds on KS . Section III includes the main result of
the paper: There we introduce a straightforward method
to obtain an upper bound on KS that satisfies the condi-
tions presented in Sec. II. This result is then illustrated
in Sec. IV for two well-known QKD protocols with im-
perfect detectors: the four-state [2] and the six-state [18]
QKD schemes. Finally, Sec. V concludes the paper with
a summary.
II. DESIRED PROPERTIES AND KNOWN
UPPER BOUNDS ON KS
A. Desired properties
The secret key rate KS, i.e., the rate of secret key that
can be obtained per signal state sent by Alice to Bob,
is one of the most important figures of merit in order to
compare the performance of different QKD schemes. Ide-
ally, one would like to calculate the maximum achievable
value of KS from the data available once the first phase
of the QKD protocol is completed. Note that the sec-
ond phase is just a classical procedure that is completely
independent of the actual experimental setup used.
In a similar spirit, any upper bound on the achiev-
able secret key rate KS should as well be valid for any
arbitrary public communication protocol performed dur-
ing the second phase of QKD. The upper bound only
depends on the observed data pij together with the par-
ticular POVMs {Ai} and {Bj} used by Alice and Bob.
This gives rise to one main requirement expected from
any upper bound on KS : if the observed data pij can
originate from a separable state, then any upper bound
must vanish [7]. That is, the upper bound might be con-
sidered as the generalization of the necessary effective
entanglement verification.
From a practical point of view, it would be necessary
that any upper bound on KS includes the effect of im-
perfect devices. Especially, it should be able to take into
account the low detection efficiency and the noise in the
form of dark counts introduced by current detection de-
vices. This fact is of special importance in order to com-
pare different realizations of QKD, and it can be used
to see the tradeoff between desired and realizable imple-
mentations of QKD.
B. Known upper bounds on KS
In this section, we review very briefly some known up-
per bounds on KS that apply to particular scenarios:
Mutual information I(A;B): Suppose Alice and Bob
are connected by a public channel and have access to
repeated independent realizations of two random vari-
ables, denoted as A and B, and which are character-
ized by a joint probability distribution pAB. An up-
per bound on the secret key rate KS is given by the
mutual information I(A;B) [19, 20]. This quantity
3is defined in terms of the Shannon entropy H(X) =
−∑x∈X p(x) log p(x) and the Shannon joint entropy
H(X,Y ) = −∑x∈X
∑
y∈Y p(x, y) log p(x, y) as
I(A;B) = H(A) +H(B)−H(A,B). (2)
This result is not surprising since the mutual information
quantifies the reduction in the uncertainty of the random
variable A because of the knowledge of B.
This upper bound can directly be used for the case
of QKD, just by taking as pAB the correlated data pij .
Moreover, in this case, one can easily incorporate the ef-
fect of the imperfections in the detectors when calculating
I(A;B). Unfortunately, the mutual information can only
provide an upper bound on KS that is not really tight.
Intrinsic information I(A;B ↓ E): It provides an up-
per bound on KS for a particular classical key-agreement
scenario. First, we describe the classical situation, and
afterward, we adapt the upper bound to the QKD sce-
nario.
In the classical case, Alice, Bob, and Eve have access to
independent realizations of three random variables, A, B,
and E, and which are described by the joint probability
distribution pABE . The intrinsic information, denoted as
I(A;B ↓ E), constitutes an upper bound on the secret
key rate KS [20]. The intrinsic information is defined as
I(A;B ↓ E) = inf
E→E¯
I(A;B|E¯), (3)
where the minimization runs over all possible classical
channels E → E¯ characterized by the transition proba-
bility PE¯|E , and where I(A;B|E¯) is the mutual informa-
tion between Alice and Bob given the public announce-
ment of Eve’s data based on the probabilities PABE¯ . This
quantity is defined in terms of the conditional Shannon
entropy H(X |e¯) =∑x∈X −p(x|e¯) log2 p(x|e¯) as
I(A;B|E¯) =
∑
e¯∈E¯
P (e¯)
[
H(A|e¯) +H(B|e¯)−H(A,B|e¯)
]
.
(4)
The intrinsic information satisfies [20]
0 ≤ KS ≤ I(A;B ↓ E) ≤ I(A;B). (5)
That is, I(A;B|E¯) is a tighter bound onKS than the mu-
tual information. However, recently it has been proven
that the secret key rate can be smaller than the intrinsic
information [21, 22].
More important for QKD, the upper bound based on
the intrinsic information can be adapted to the case
where Alice, Bob, and Eve start sharing a tripartite
quantum state instead of a joint probability distribution.
For this purpose, one can consider all possible tripar-
tite states that Eve can establish using her eavesdropping
method, and all possible measurements she could perform
on her subsystem. This gives rise to a set of possible ex-
tensions P of the probability distribution PAB to PABE .
Now one can define the intrinsic information as [7]
I(A;B ↓ E) = inf
P
I(A;B|E) . (6)
As in the case of the mutual information, also this
bound allows us to include the imperfections of the de-
tection devices when calculating I(A;B ↓ E). More-
over, it provides effective entanglement verification, i.e.,
I(A;B ↓ E) = 0 if and only if the equivalence class S
contains a separable state [7, 16]. Unfortunately, it re-
quires us to solve an infimum problem that is not easy to
compute. Note that if the range of the random variable
E is finite, then the infimum becomes a minimum over
channels with the same alphabet [17].
Regularized relative entropy of entanglement
E∞r (ρAB): Suppose Alice and Bob share several
copies of a quantum state ρAB, and they are allowed to
perform arbitrary local operations and classical commu-
nication (LOCC). The regularized relative entropy of
entanglement E∞r (ρAB) is an upper bound on KS [11].
The relative entropy of entanglement Er(ρAB) is given
by [12, 23]
Er(ρAB) = inf
σsep
Tr[ρAB (log ρAB − log σsep)]. (7)
where the infimum is taken over all separable states σsep.
The regularized version of Er(ρAB) is given by [14, 24]:
E∞r (ρAB) = lim
n→∞
Er(ρ
⊗n
AB)
n
. (8)
This quantity depends only on the shared quantum states
ρAB, and therefore it does not include the possible im-
perfections on the detectors of Alice and Bob. Moreover,
to calculate the regularized relative entropy of entangle-
ment of a given quantum state is, in general, a quite dif-
ficult task, and analytical expressions are only available
for some particular states [14].
Intrinsic information of a tripartite quantum state
I(ρABE): Assume Alice, Bob, and Eve share several
copies of a quantum state ρABE , and they are allowed
to perform arbitrary LOCC and may communicate via a
public channel. The intrinsic information of the tripartite
quantum state ρABE is defined as [15]
I(ρABE) = inf
Ek
∑
k
p(ek)S(A;B)ek , (9)
with S(A;B)ek = S(ρ
ek
A ) + S(ρ
ek
B ) − S(ρekAB) being the
quantum mutual information of the conditional state
ρekAB = TrE(EkρABE)/p(ek), and represents an upper
bound on KS [15]. Here S(ρ) denotes the von Neu-
mann entropy of the state ρ. It is defined as S(ρ) ≡
−Tr(ρ log2 ρ). The infimum given in Eq. (9) runs over all
possible POVMs {Ek}.
This upper bound depends only on the quantum state
ρABE and its definition does not include the effect of
possible imperfections in the detectors of Alice and Bob
in the most general case.
III. UPPER BOUND ON KS
In this section, we introduce a simple procedure, cf.
Sec. III D, to obtain an upper bound on KS that satisfies
4the two desired conditions presented in Sec. II. Moreover,
this procedure has the advantage that it is straightfor-
ward to calculate. In order to do that, we start by pre-
senting a naive method which allows the derivation of a
simple upper bound on KS . This method is based on im-
posing a particular eavesdropping strategy by Eve, and
it guarantees that any resulting upper bound is able to
monitor possible detector inefficiencies by construction.
The necessary entanglement verification condition is then
included as a particular example of this method. This is
done by selecting a special eavesdropping strategy that
exploits the best separable approximation (BSA) [26, 27].
A. Simple method to derive upper bounds on KS
The idea is simple: just impose some particular eaves-
dropping strategy for Eve, and then use one of the al-
ready known upper bounds. The upper bound obtained
represents an upper bound for any possible eavesdrop-
ping strategy. If we use as starting point, for instance,
the intrinsic information, then the bound would be able
to include the effect of imperfect detectors. The method
can be described with the following three steps.
(1) Select a particular eavesdropping strategy for Eve.
This strategy is given by the choice of a tripartite quan-
tum state ρABE and a POVM {Ek}. The only restriction
here is TrE(ρABE) ∈ S. That is, the chosen strategy can-
not alter the observed distribution pij .
(2) Select three random variables A, B, and E with
probability distribution pijk = Tr(AiBjEk ρABE). Note
that the POVMs of Alice {Ai} and Bob {Bj} are known
and cannot be modified by Eve.
(3) Calculate the intrinsic information IEk(A;B ↓ E),
where the subscript Ek denotes the chosen measure-
ment strategy for Eve. The secret key rate KS is upper
bounded by IEk(A;B ↓ E).
Step (3) could also be substituted by an optimization
taken over all possible measurement strategies performed
by Eve. That is, one might use as upper bound [16]
KS ≤ inf
Ek
IEk(A;B ↓ E) = inf
Ek
IEk(A;B|E). (10)
Moreover, in this last case, it is easy to see that the same
upper bound could also be obtained from the intrinsic
information of a tripartite quantum state. The corre-
sponding steps for this case are included in App. A.
This method does not always guarantee effective en-
tanglement verification, but this depends on the eaves-
dropping strategy selected in step (1). In Sec. III C we
introduce a special eavesdropping strategy that guaran-
tees that this property is always satisfied. It is based on
the use of the BSA of a quantum state [26, 27]. Next,
we introduce the equivalence between the BSA idea and
effective entanglement verification.
B. Best separable approximation and necessary
entanglement verification
The best separable approximation (BSA) [26, 27] of
a given state ρAB is the decomposition of ρAB into a
separable state σsep and an entangled state ρent, while
maximizing the weight of the separable part. That is,
given an arbitrary state ρAB, it can be proven that this
state can always be written in a unique way as
ρAB = λmax(ρAB)σsep + [1− λmax(ρAB)]ρent, (11)
where the entanglement state ρent has no product vectors
in its range, and the real parameter λmax(ρAB) ≥ 0 is
maximal [26, 27].
Given an equivalence class S of quantum states, one
defines the maximum weight of separability within the
equivalence class, λSmax, as
λSmax = max {λmax(ρAB) | ρAB ∈ S} . (12)
This parameter is related to the task of effective entan-
glement verification by the following observation.
Observation 1. Assume that Alice and Bob can per-
form local measurements with POVM elements Ai and
Bj , respectively, to obtain the probability distribution of
the outcomes pij on the distributed quantum state ρAB.
Then the following two statements are equivalent: (1)
The correlations pij can originate from a separable state.
(2) The maximum weight of separability λSmax within the
equivalence class of quantum states S compatible with
the observed data pij satisfies λ
S
max = 1.
Proof. If pij can originate from a separable state, then
there exists σsep such as σsep ∈ S. Moreover, we have
that any separable state satisfy λmax(σsep) = 1. The
other direction is trivial. 
Let us define Smax as the equivalence class of quantum
states composed by those states ρAB ∈ S with maximum
weight of separability
Smax =
{
ρAB ∈ S | λmax(ρAB) = λSmax
}
. (13)
C. Eavesdropping strategy
Eve’s eavesdropping strategy is completely character-
ized by selecting a tripartite quantum state ρABE and
a POVM {Ek}. We consider a pure state ρABE =
|Φ〉ABE〈Φ| that is a purification of a state ρAB chosen
from the equivalence class Smax.
We can write the separable part σsep and the entangled
part ρent of the BSA of ρAB as
σsep =
∑
i
qi|φi〉A〈φi| ⊗ |ϕi〉B〈ϕi|, (14)
ρent =
∑
i
pi|ψi〉AB〈ψi|. (15)
5The tripartite state |Φ〉ABE is then given by
|Φ〉ABE =
∑
i
√
λSmaxqi|φi〉A|ϕi〉B|ei〉E +
∑
j
√
(1− λSmax)pj |ψj〉AB|fj〉E , (16)
where the states {|ei〉E , |fj〉E} form an orthogonal ba-
sis on Eve’s subsystem. It is important to note that
in both kinds of QKD schemes, EB schemes and PM
schemes, Eve can have access to the state |Φ〉ABE given
by Eq. (16) [7]. In an EB scheme, this is clear since
Eve is the one who prepares the state ρAB and who dis-
tributes it to Alice and Bob. In the case of PM schemes,
we need to show additionally that the state |Φ〉ABE can
be obtained by Eve by interaction with Bob’s system
only. In the Schmidt decomposition, the state prepared
by Alice, |ψsource〉AB, can be written as |ψsource〉AB =∑
i ci|ui〉A|vi〉B . Then the Schmidt decomposition of
|Φ〉ABE , with respect to system A and the composite
system BE, is of the form |Φ〉ABE =
∑
i ci|ui〉A|e˜i〉BE ,
since ci and |ui〉A are fixed by the known reduced den-
sity matrix ρA to the corresponding values of |ψsource〉AB.
Then one can find a suitable unitary operator UBE such
that |e˜i〉BE = UBE |vi〉B |0〉E where |0〉E is an initial state
of an auxiliary system.
As a measurement strategy for Eve, we consider that
she is restricted to use a special class of measurements.
This class of measurements can be thought of as a two
step procedure.
(1) First, Eve distinguishes contributions coming from
the separable part and from the entangled part of ρAB:
σsep and ρent, respectively. This corresponds to a pro-
jection of Eve’s subsystem onto the orthogonal subspaces
Πsep =
∑
i |ei〉E〈ei| and Πent =
∑
j |fj〉E〈fj |.
(2) Afterward, she performs a refined measurement on
each subspace separately. In the separable subspace, Eve
can obtain complete information, and no secret key can
be distilled by Alice and Bob [7, 16]. This corresponds to
a projection onto the orthogonal quantum states {|ei〉}.
In the entanglement part, Eve performs a POVM denoted
as {Fl}.
We find that Eve’s measurement result belongs to the
separable subspace with probability λSmax, and therefore,
KS = 0.
With probability 1 − λSmax, Eve’s subsystem is in the
entanglement subspace and KS might be bigger than
zero. After the first step of Eve’s measurement, the con-
ditional quantum state of Alice, Bob, and Eve, denoted
as ρentABE = |Φent〉ABE〈Φent|, corresponds to a purifica-
tion of ρent, i.e.,
|Φent〉ABE =
∑
j
√
pj |ψj〉AB|fj〉E . (17)
Note that both steps can be described as well together
by the following POVM: {E˜isep, E˜lent}, with E˜isep =
|ei〉〈ei| and E˜lent = FlΠent.
In the next section, we provide an upper bound for
KS that arises from this special eavesdropping strategy.
Moreover, as we will see, the upper bound obtained is
straightforward to calculate.
D. Resulting upper bound
Only the entangled part ρent which appears in the
BSA decomposition of a given state ρAB might allow Al-
ice and Bob to distill a secret key in the eavesdropping
strategy proposed in the previous section. Moreover, Eve
can always find such an eavesdropping strategy for any
ρAB ∈ Smax. This fact motivates the definition of a new
equivalence class of quantum states Sentmax
Sentmax = {ρent(ρAB) | ρAB ∈ Smax)} , (18)
where ρent(ρAB) denotes the entangled part in the BSA
of the state ρAB.
Theorem 1. Consider all possible bipartite entan-
glement states ρent ∈ Sentmax, and consider all possible
POVMs {Fl} that Eve could perform on a purification
|Φent〉ABE of the quantum state ρent. This gives rise
to a set P of tripartite probability distributions pijl =
Tr(AiBjFl|Φent〉ABE〈Φent|), where {Ai} and {Bj} rep-
resent the POVMs measured by Alice and Bob. The
secret key rate KS is upper bounded by
KS ≤ (1− λSmax) inf
P
Ient(A;B|E), (19)
where Ient(A;B|E) represents the classical conditional
mutual information of three random variables distributed
accordingly to pijl.
Proof : This proof is straightforward since, by con-
struction, Eq. (19) is an upper bound of the intrinsic
information defined in Eq. (6). Note that to obtain
Eq. (19), we assume a particular type of eavesdropping
for Eve, and in Eq. (6), the infimum is taken over all
possible eavesdropping strategies. 
Instead of optimizing over all possible states ρAB ∈
Sentmax and all possible measurements performed by Eve,
one could also take any state in Sentmax and calculate the
infimum of Ient(A;B|E) over all possible POVMs {Fl}
employed by Eve. This fact simplifies the calculation of
the upper bound on KS.
Corollary 1. Given a state ρent ∈ Sentmax, the secret key
rate KS is upper bounded by
KS ≤ (1− λSmax) inf
Fl
IentFl (A;B|E), (20)
with IentFl (A;B|E) being the classical conditional mu-
tual information calculated on the probability distri-
bution pijl = Tr(AiBjFl|Φent〉ABE〈Φent|), and where|Φent〉ABE denotes a purification of ρent.
Proof. Equation (20) is an upper bound of Eq. (19).
Note that in Eq. (20), we take a particular state ρent ∈
Sentmax, while the infimum in Eq. (19) includes all possible
states ρent ∈ Sentmax. 
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lary 1 are easier to calculate than the one based on the
intrinsic information defined in Eq. (6) [28]. However,
they still demand solving a difficult optimization prob-
lem. Next, we provide a simple upper bound on KS
that is straightforward to calculate. Then, in Sec. IV, we
illustrate the performance of this upper bound for two
well-known QKD protocols with imperfect detectors: the
four-state [2] and the six-state [18] QKD schemes. We
compare it with the upper bound given by the regular-
ized relative entropy of entanglement [11].
Corollary 2 : The secret key rate KS is upper bounded
by
KS ≤ (1− λSmax)Ient(A;B), (21)
where Ient(A;B) denotes the mutual information calcu-
lated on the probability distribution p˜ij = Tr(AiBjρent)
with ρent ∈ Sentmax.
Proof : Equation (21) is an upper bound of Eq. (20),
i.e., infFl I
ent
Fl
(A;B|E) ≤ Ient(A;B). Note that Eve
could always select a POVM with only one element
F˜l = 1 . In this case, we have I
ent
F˜l
(A;B|E) = Ient(A;B).

In Sec. IV, we show that, for qubit-based QKD pro-
tocols, the upper bound given by Corollary 1 and by
Corollary 2 coincide.
The main difficulty when evaluating this last upper
bound for a particular realization of QKD relies on ob-
taining λSmax and ρent. This can be solved by apply-
ing results from relaxation theory of nonconvex problems
[29, 30, 31]. See also Ref. [32]. The solution is included
in App. B.
The three bounds on KS obtained in this section sat-
isfy the two desired properties included in Sec. II A: the
factor 1− λSmax accounts for effective entanglement veri-
fication by Observation 1, and the probabilities pijl and
p˜ij reflect possible detector inefficiencies.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE UPPER BOUND
In this section, we evaluate the upper bound on KS
given by Eq. (21) for two well-known qubit-based QKD
protocols with imperfect detectors: the four-state [2] and
the six-state [18] QKD schemes. We refer here to single-
photon implementations of the qubit. The state of the
qubit is described by some degree of freedom in the po-
larization of the photon.
We start by describing the detection devices employed
by Alice and Bob. They are characterized by some noise
in the form of dark counts which are, to a good approxi-
mation, independent of the incoming signals, and by their
detection efficiency η.
Dark counts: For simplicity, we assume that only
Bob’s detection device is affected by the presence of dark
counts. We consider that Alice’s detectors are ideal. The
total dark count probability is denoted as d. A typical
value for this parameter is d = 10−6. This scenario can
be modeled by transforming every ideal POVM element
Bj of Bob into a noisy element B˜j given by
B˜j = (1− d)Bj + dj1B, (22)
where the parameters dj satisfy d =
∑
j dj .
The effect of the noise can be included in the calcu-
lation of the upper bound given by Eq. (21) via the
classical mutual information Ient(A;B). We have that
Ient(A;B) > Ient(A; B˜) simply because the raw data is
affected by more noise which needs to be corrected.
It is important to note that the effective entanglement
verification alone cannot include the noise coming from
the dark counts of the detectors. In the ideal case, Alice
and Bob observe outcomes governed by the ideal proba-
bility distribution pij , which defines the equivalence class
of quantum states S. In the noisy scenario, on the con-
trary, Alice and Bob obtain the probability distribution
p˜ij = (1 − d)pij + djpi defining an equivalence class S˜.
In principle, both probability distributions are different.
However, in the trusted device scenario, Alice and Bob
know all the parameters dj . This means that they can
obtain pij from p˜ij : pij = 1/(1 − d)(p˜ij − djpi), and
where pi =
∑
j p˜ij [33]. That is, we obtain S˜ = S: any
upper bound which only depends on the shared quantum
state ρAB provides the same upper bound independently
of the noise introduced by the detectors.
Detector efficiency: Detectors are characterized as well
by their detector efficiency ηj . This effect can be modeled
by a combination of a beam splitter of transmittance ηj
and an ideal detector [34]. A typical value for ηj in cur-
rent realizations of QKD is approximately 0.15. In order
to include the losses of the detectors, we can transform
every POVM element Bj that corresponds to a “click”
event into
B˜j = ηjBj . (23)
Additionally, the event “no click” corresponds to the fol-
lowing operator:
Bvac =
∑
j
(1− ηj)Bj + |vac〉〈vac|. (24)
where |vac〉 represents the vacuum state.
As in the case of dark counts, the effect of the losses is
incorporated in Eq. (21) via the classical mutual informa-
tion Ient(A;B). For simplicity, we consider that ηj = η
for all the detectors.
In Fig. 1, we illustrated the upper bound given by
Eq. (21) for the four-state [2] and the six-state [18] QKD
schemes. In the case of the four-state EB protocol, Al-
ice and Bob perform projection measurements onto two
mutually unbiased bases, say the ones given by the eigen-
vectors of the two Pauli operators σx and σz . In the cor-
responding PM scheme, Alice can use as well the same
set of measurements but now on a maximally entangled
state. For the case of the six-state EB protocol, Alice and
70 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Channel Error Probability e
K S
FIG. 1: Upper bound on the secret key rate KS given
by Eq. (21) for the four-state (dashed) and the six-state
(dash-dotted) QKD schemes. The classical correlated data
pij is obtained by measuring the quantum state ρAB(e) =
(1 − 2e)|ψ+〉〈ψ+| + e1 /2, where e is the error probability
of a depolarizing channel. The two upper lines (dashed and
dash-dotted) correspond to the ideal case where the total dark
count probability is d = 0, and the detector efficiency is η = 1.
The two lines below represent the typical case in current real-
izations of QKD: d = 10−6 and η = 0.15. The solid line of the
graphic represent the upper bound for KS given by the reg-
ularized relative entropy of entanglement E∞r (ρAB(e)). Note
that we assume an asymmetric basis choice to suppress the
sifting effect [36].
Bob perform projection measurements onto the eigenvec-
tors of the three Pauli operators σx, σy, and σz on the
bipartite qubit states distributed by Eve. In the corre-
sponding PM scheme Alice prepares the eigenvectors of
those operators by performing the same measurements on
a maximally entangled two-qubit state. Note that here
we are not using the general approach introduced pre-
viously, |ψsource〉AB =
∑
i
√
pi|αi〉A|ϕi〉B, to model PM
schemes, since for this protocol it is sufficient to consider
that the effectively distributed quantum state consists
only of two qubits.
We model the transmission channel as a depolarizing
channel with error probability e. This means that, in
both protocols, the joint probability distribution pij is
obtained by measuring the quantum state
ρAB(e) = (1− 2e)|ψ+〉〈ψ+|+ e
2
1 , (25)
where the state |ψ+〉 represents a maximally entangled
two-qubit state: |ψ+〉 = 1/√2(|00〉 + |11〉). In Fig. 1,
we assume as well that the total dark count probability
is d = 10−6, and the detector efficiency is η = 0.15.
Moreover, we consider that all detectors have the same
dark count probability.
It is important to note that in this simple two-
qubit scenario, the conditional mutual information
IentFl (A;B|E) reduces to Ient(A;B): in this case ρent
is just a pure entangled state [26], i.e., the purification
|Φent〉 of the quantum state ρent is of the form |Φent〉 =
|ψ〉AB⊗|ϕ〉E . For qubit-based QKD protocols, therefore,
the upper bound given by Corollary 1 and by Corollary 2
coincide since infFl I
ent
Fl
(A;B|E) = Ient(A;B). In order
to calculate the maximum weight of separability λSmax,
and its associated entangled state ρent which are neces-
sary to evaluate Eq. (21) we use the method described in
Appendix B.
Figure 1 includes also a comparison with the upper
bound on KS given by the regularized relative entropy
of entanglement [11]. To calculate E∞r (ρAB(e)), we use
the results included in Ref. [14]. Despite its simplicity,
the upper bound given by Eq. (21) can provide a tighter
bound on KS than the one proposed in Ref. [11], when
dealing with typical parameter values for imperfect de-
tectors. It must be mentioned here, however, that the
bound given by E∞r (ρAB(e)) was proposed in a different
scenario, and the possibility of having noisy and lossy
detectors was not considered. The results obtained can
also be compared with the best lower bounds for the tol-
erable error rate e arising from known security proofs
[35]: e = 0.2 for the case of the four-state protocol, and
e = 0.276 for the six-state protocol.
V. CONCLUSION
A necessary precondition for secure quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) is that sender and receiver can use their
available measurement results to prove the presence of
entanglement in a quantum state that is effectively dis-
tributed between them. Moreover, this result applies
both to prepare and measure and entanglement-based
schemes.
Unfortunately, this effective entanglement verification
answers only partially the important question of how
much secret key can be obtained by Alice and Bob from
their correlated data: it just tells if the secret key rate is
zero or it may be positive.
In this paper, we present a simple method to obtain an
upper bound on the secret key rate that is particularly
suited to evaluate practical realizations of QKD schemes.
It is based on the correlated data, but it also monitors any
form of detector imperfections. In particular, we consider
the so-called trusted device scenario, where Eve cannot
modify the actual detection devices employed by Alice
and Bob. We assume that the legitimate users have com-
plete knowledge about their detectors, which are fixed by
the actual experiment.
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APPENDIX A: EQUIVALENT METHOD
In this Appendix, we present an alternative method
to the one introduced in Sec. III A that provides exactly
the same upper bound on KS . It uses the intrinsic in-
formation of a tripartite quantum state, and it can be
described with the following steps:
(1) Select a particular eavesdropping strategy for Eve.
This strategy is given by the choice of a tripartite quan-
tum state ρABE . The restriction here is TrE(ρABE) ∈ S.
(2) Compute the so-called ccq state. This state is of
the form [25]:
ρccqABE =
∑
ij
|ij〉AB〈ij| ⊗ ρijE (A1)
where the state ρijE is not normalized and it is given by
ρijE = TrAB(AiBjρABE).
(3) The upper bound on KS is given by the intrinsic
information of the tripartite ccq state ρccqABE .
The equivalence of this method and the one introduced
in Sec. III A can be seen as follows: if the chosen tripartite
state ρABE is the same for both methods and one fixes
a measurement strategy {Ek} for Eve, then the condi-
tional quantum mutual information S(A;B)ek is equal
to IEk(A;B|E = ek). Note that in this case, the condi-
tional state becomes ρccq,ekAB =
∑
ij p(ai, bj|ek)|ij〉AB〈ij|.
APPENDIX B: OBTAINING λSmax AND ρent
Here we use the method proposed in Ref. [32] to ob-
tain the parameter λSmax and the density operator ρent. It
is based on results from relaxation theory of nonconvex
problems [29, 30, 31], notably the method of Lasserre
[30]. The central observation in Ref. [32] is that many
problems related with entanglement can be cast into
the form of optimization problems with polynomial con-
straints of low degree (three or less). The polynomial part
of the optimization problems is still nonconvex and com-
putationally expensive to solve. However, one can find
hierarchies of solutions in a way that each step is a bet-
ter approximation to the exact solution than the previ-
ous one. Moreover, each step can be efficiently solved via
semidefinite programming [37]. The hierarchy is asymp-
totically complete, in the sense that the exact solution is
asympotically attained.
It is important to note that the method introduced
in Ref. [32] is not only meant as a numerical method,
but each instance of the hierarchy delivers a semidefinite
program that is accessible with analytical methods.
Next, we explain how to cast the problem of finding
λSmax and ρent into the desired form analyzed in Ref. [32].
The equivalence class of quantum states S is defined by
the POVMs {Ai⊗Bj} and the observed data pij : ρAB ≥
0 belongs to S if it satisfies Tr(Ai ⊗BjρAB) = pij for all
i, j. The BSA for ρAB can be written in the following
way
ρAB = min
Tr(ρ˜ent)
σ˜sep + ρ˜ent (B1)
with σ˜sep ≡ λmax(ρAB)σsep and ρ˜ent ≡ [1 −
λmax(ρAB)]ρent. Separable states σ˜sep can be charac-
terized in terms of product vectors σ˜sep =
∑
i Pi, with
Pi = pi|ψi〉〈ψi| ⊗ |φi〉〈φi|. To guarantee that the opera-
tors Pi have the desired product form, they must satisfy
the following constraints [32]:
Tr[TrI(Pi)
2] = [Tr(Pi)]
2 (B2)
Pi ≥ 0, (B3)
with I = {A,B}. The associated optimisation problem
can now be written as
minimize t,
subject to t ≥ 1− Tr(σ˜sep),
ρAB ≥ 0,
Tr(ρAB) = 1,
Tr(Ai ⊗BjρAB) = pij ∀i, j,
σ˜sep =
∑
i
Pi,
Tr[TrI(Pi)
2] = [Tr(Pi)]
2 ∀I = A,B,
Pi ≥ 0,
ρAB − σ˜sep ≥ 0, (B4)
where the parameter t represents the trace of the quan-
tum state ρ˜ent. This polynomial optimization problem
can be solved with the help of Lasserre’s method [30]. For
these calculations, the package GloptiPoly [38] based on
SeDuMi [39] is freely available. The package GloptiPoly
has a number of desirable features, in particular, it pro-
vides a certificate for global optimality.
Note that in low dimensional cases (2 ⊗ 2, 2 ⊗ 3) the
characterization of separable states can be simplified to
those states σ˜sep ≥ 0 such as σ˜TBsep ≥ 0 [40], where TP
is the partial transposition, that is, the transposition
with respect to one subsystem. The problem given by
Eq. (B4) can be reduced then to one containing only lin-
ear and semidefinite constraints. Problems of this form
can be solved very efficiently with standard semidefinite
programming modules [37].
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